Due Process -- Jurisdiction Over Non-Resident Trustees by Ezzo, Ralph P.
University of Miami Law School
Institutional Repository
University of Miami Law Review
12-1-1958
Due Process -- Jurisdiction Over Non-Resident
Trustees
Ralph P. Ezzo
Follow this and additional works at: http://repository.law.miami.edu/umlr
This Case Noted is brought to you for free and open access by Institutional Repository. It has been accepted for inclusion in University of Miami Law
Review by an authorized administrator of Institutional Repository. For more information, please contact library@law.miami.edu.
Recommended Citation
Ralph P. Ezzo, Due Process -- Jurisdiction Over Non-Resident Trustees, 13 U. Miami L. Rev. 246 (1958)
Available at: http://repository.law.miami.edu/umlr/vol13/iss2/10
UNIVERSITY OF MIAMI LAW REVIEW V
act, authenticated by an official of a foreign religious society even if
locally incorporated, would be binding upon a governmental agency.
EDWARD KAUFMAN
DUE PROCESS* - JURISDICTION OVER
NON-RESIDENT TRUSTEES
A testatrix-settlor executed an inter vivos trust narning a Delaware
corporate trustee. Power to alter, amend, revoke, change the trustee and
receive income for life was reserved. It was further provided that the settlor
had a power of appointment as to the relmaining corpus, either inter vivos
or testamentary. After becoming domiciled in Florida, she made her last
appointment in favor of two previously created trusts in Delaware, with the
remainder in favor of the executrix, the appellant. The will directed the
portion appointed to the appellant be paid in equal installments to the
testatrix's two daughters, the appellces. The latter sued for declaratory
relief urging the invalidity of the last created trusts as an invalid disposition
under the Florida statute of wills.' Personal service was effected upon a
majority of interested persons except the Delaware trustee; however, a copy
of the pleadings together with a notice to appear were sent to the trustee
and notice was published locally in compliance with the Florida constructive
service statute.2 The Florida court held the trust invalid and that jurisdiction
to construe the will entailed substantive jurisdiction over absent defendants
even though the trust assets were not within the state. The appellant-
executrix brought suit in Delaware and that state's supreme court held
that there had been a lack of jurisdiction and refused full faith and credit
to the Florida decree.4 On certiorari to the United States Supreme Court,
held, Florida decree reversed (that state having had insufficient contacts
to give it jurisdiction); Dclaware decree affirmed. Hanson v. Denkla, 357
U.S. 235 (1958).
The law in regard to a forum state's jurisdiction over non-residents
has passed through three major stages in its evolutionary process.5 Stage
One need only be traced back to the landmark case of Pennoyer v. Neff
*For a detailed discussion see Comment, this issue 1p. 205, supra.
1, FLA. STAT. § 731.07 (1957).
2. FLA. STAT. § 48.01 (1957).
3. Hanson v. Denckla, 100 So. 2d 378 (Fla. 1956).
4. Hanson v. Wilmington Trust Co., 119 A.2d 901 (Del. 1957).
5. Presence, minimum contacts, minimum contact, [seemingly from the case of
McGee v. International Life Insurance Co., 355 U.S. 220 (1957)1. Consent is embraced
in the presence theory, see Travelers Ass'n v. Virginia, 339 U.S. 643 (1950).
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wherein the "presence thcory" was clearly cnunciated. 6 Presence within
the forum state was absolutely necessary in order to gain personal juris-
diction over a non-resident. Any judgment rendered without personal
service within the territorial limits of the forum was a clear violation of
the "due process" clause of the fourtccnth amendment,7 and as such was
null and void.8  The court further stated that a state has judicial
jurisdiction over property situated within its borders regardless of the
domicile of the property owner. However, a person seeking relief out of
the proceeds of a non-resident's property must institute in rein proceedings
by first making a valid attachment and then proceed to a judgment against
the property. The owner of the property was liable only to the extent of the
proceeds of the attachment sale. This rigid principle became embedded in
our law and remained for over fifty years.
In 1945, Stage Two, the "minimum contacts" theory appeared on our
judicial scene in the case of International Shoe Co. v. State of Washington.
The State of Washington was attempting to enforce workmen's compensa-
tion contributions"' against the non-resident corporate defendant. Service of
process was made on a local salesman, and notice by registered mail was
made to the corporation's home office. The corporation appeared specially
to contest the jurisdiction of the Washington court contending that the
personal service upon the salesman was not service upon the corporation;
the corporation was not a Washington corporation, and the corporation
was not doing business in the State of Washington. The Court, in a
lengthy opinion, reviewed the technological developments in this country
in the area of transportation, and decided to relax the rigid rule advanced
in Pennoyer v. Neff. The Court held that sales solicitation within the
state amounted to "minimum contacts" with the state so as to make the
defendant amenable to litigation arising out of that business activity within
the state." This broad grant of jurisdictional power was held not to offend
the traditional notions of fair play and justice. Prior to this decision states
were successfully evading the strict and technical meaning of Pennoyer v.
Neff by enacting statutes which would give the state jurisdiction over non-
residents without personal service in cases involving public policy.12 This
6. 95 U.S. 714 (1877); Prior to this case the law was based on D'Arcy v.
Ketchum, 52 U.S. (II flow.) 165 (1850), wherein the court placed its stamp of approval
upon a state court's refusal to grant full faith and credit where a default judgment was
rendered in personam against a non resident of the forum state.
7. U.S. CoNsi.. amend. XIV § 1.
8. 95 U.S. at 728.
9. 326 U.S. 310 (1945).
10. WASH. REV. STAT. § 9998-1039 (1941).
11. But see, Perkins, v. Benguet Cons. Min. Co., 342 U.S. 437 (1952); Missouri
K. & T. R.R. v. Reynolds, 255 U.S. 565 (1920); St. Louis S.W. R.R. v. Alexander,227 U.S. 218 (1912); Tauza v. Susquehana Coal Co., 220 N.Y. 259, 115 N.E. 915(1917).
12. E.g., FLA. STAT. § 47.29 (1957); MD. CODF Art. 66 , (1951) § 113 as
amended; N.Y. VEHICLE & TRAFFiC LAw, § 52; Onio REv. CODE § 2703.20 (1953).Constitutionality of the above type statutes upheld in Hess v. Pawloski, 274 U.S. 352(1927).
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activity, together with the International Shoe case, indicated a strong trend
away from thc Court's fcar of extratcrritorial jurisdiction impairing the
sovcreignty of sister states, 1  and toward litigating in a forum convenient
to both parties. 4
Stage Three appeared to settle the questions in the minds of the legal
scholars as to the sufficiency of the contacts needed. A Texas corporation
issued a reinsurance certificate in the State of California. Notices of
premiums due were sent into the state, and premium payments were
mailed from California to Texas. The defendant corporation had no
other contact with the state. Upon the death of the insured, the insurance
company refused to pay on tile contract claiming that the death was a
suicide. The beneficiary brought suit in California; service of process being
cffected by notice by registered letter sent to the Texas corporation. The
court gave a judgment to the beneficiary. After receiving the California
judgment, the Texas court refused to grant full faith and credit to the
judgment on the basis of lack of jurisdiction. 5 The Supreme Court granted
certiorari " ' and held that the Texas corporation had a "minimum contact"
with the state of California sufficient to make the corporation subject to
litigation arising ili that state.' The effect of this decision caused legal
writers to speculate more freely on the demise of Pennoyer v. Neff, and
that reasonable notice and convenience of the parties was all that was
necessary for a state court to take jurisdiction over a non-resident.' 8
In the instant case, the majority" attempted to distinguish the McGee
case primarily on the premise that the action was not based on an act done
or consummated in the forum state." It was conceded that conducting
a trust business within the state of Florida can be compared with the
mailing aspect of the McGee case, but the Justices were unable to find
a substantial contact between the forum and the Delaware trustee.2 1
The court pointed out the fact that the insurance contract in McGee
13. Fear of extraterritorial jurisdiction was a traditional notion among the courts as
indicated in the dictum of the Pennoyer case. Further evidence of this is the adoption
of various uniform acts by almost all states and territories. See e.g. Uniform Reciprical
Enforcement of Support Act, 9c U.L.A. § 1.
14. Latimer v. S/S Industries Reunidas F. Mataraze, 175 F.2d 184 (2d Cir. 1949);
Kirkpatrick v. Texas & P. R.R,, 166 F.2d 788 (2d Cir. 1948); (opinions by Judge
Learned Hand): Ehrcnzweig, The Transient Rule of P ersonal jnrisdictin, The "Power"
Myth And Forum Conveniens, 65 YALE L. J. 309 (1956); Ehrenzweig, Pennoyer is Dead,
Long Live Pennoyer, 30 Rocky Mt. L. Rev. 285 (1958).
15. McGee v. International Life Ins. Co., 288 S.W.2d 579 (1956); (holding thejudgment unconstitutional and void).
16. 352 U.S. 924 (1956).
17. McGee v. International Life Ins. Co., 355 U.S. 220 (1957); the dictum
indicated that the corporation had no right not to be stied, citing Beenlicimer v. Converse
206 U.S. 516 (1906).
18. See authorities cited in note 14, supra.
19. Black, Burton, Brennan, and Douglas dissenting.
20. Further distinctions are: special legislatiou in California, Florida Statute making
a trustee an indispensible party to litigation involving the trust.
21. 357 U.S. at 253.
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bore a substantial conuection with the state of California in that the state
was attempting to provide redress for its residents in their dealings with
non-resident insurauce companies22'-' The two cases were further distin-
guished by stating that the appointment made in Florida was not comparable
to the insurance contract entered into in California; it was the validity
of the trust and not the appointment that was in issue in the case.2 3 Is
Chief Justice Varren suggesting that the "minimum contact" must be in
issue in the case? If so, the reasoning appears fallacious. In McGee it was
the suicide of the insured and not the insurance contract which was in
issue. The Court was steadfast in its refusal to find a connection between
the Delaware trustee and the state of Florida. It was stated that the
trustee did not earn, on a single act which would amount to "doing
business" within the state. Hence, the quality of this contact was not
comparable with the insurance policy in McGee.
It is on this point that criticism could reasonably be directed to the
majority opinion. The scttlor became domiciled in Florida in 1944, and
so remained until her death in 1952. During this entire period the trustee
bank had the use of her funds; a fundamental aspect of the banking
business. In 1949, the last appointment was made causing one-half million
dollars to he transferred to the trusts in question. Thus, for a period of
four years, the trustee had a substantial amount of investment capital
placed with the bank by a Florida resident. It is difficult to conceive how
the Court could possibly contend that the Dclaware trustee was not doing
business in the state of Florida.
An analysis of the decisions which have been rendered in lower courts
since the McGee case would seem to provide a more justifiable reason
for the Hanson decision than the reasons advanced by the Court. A
federal court in Kentucky, cited McGee in granting the state of Kentucky
jurisdiction over a West Virginia radio corporation whose broadcast was
being carried in the border area in Kentucky. The'broadcast, together with
a nominal amount of advertising sold in one county, formed the basis for
allowing jurisdiction. -" A federal court in Louisiana gave that state juris-
diction, citing McGee, where the only contact with the state and the
insurance company was the occurrence of an automobile accident within
the state involving the insured out-of-state vehicle.25
The Court's realization of the far reaching affects of the McGee case,
as indicated by the cases mentioned, was the sole basis for the decision
22. CAL. INS. ConE, §§ 1610-1620.
23. Supra, note 21.
24. W.S.A.Z., Inc. v. Lyons, 254 F.2d 242 (E.D. Ky. 1958). This was a libel
action arising in a county in Kentucky. It appears that the court is placing much
emphasis on the advertising done in this one county to form the basis for taking juris-
diction. Where is the relationship between the going business and the act complained of?
25. Pugh v. Oklahoma Farm Bureau, 159 F. Supp. 155 (E.D. Ky. 1958).
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in the instant case. Its reluctance to settle this phase of the law will call
for a complete reversal by the legal writers who presumed the premature
demise of Pennoyer v. Neff.- ' Although Ilanson did not set out the limits
of personal jurisdiction for future litigants, it did establish one point
directly-Pennoyer lingers on.
Ralph P. Ezzo
AUTOMOBILES-DANGEROUS INSTRUMENTALITY-
RENTAL OWNERS
The owner of a rental automobile informed tile renter that tile car
was not to be driven by anyone other than himself and included a
clause to that effect in the contract. The bailec allowed a third party
to use the car who negligently collided with the plaintiff's automobile.
Held, the contract provision does not relieve the company of responsibility
for negligent operation of the automobile by a person other than the
renter. Leonard v. Susco Car Rental Sys., 103 So.2d 243 (V1a. App. 1958).
The common-law generally restricts liability of an automobile owner
for the negligent operation of his vehicle by another to the master-servant
relationship; in the absence of such a relationship the owner who
entrusts his car to a competent operator is not responsible for the operator's
negligence while he is using the car for his own purposes.' Several states
have enacted statutes which modify this common-law rule restricting
liability to the doctrine of respondeat superior.2 but only one jurisdiction,
Florida, has judicially expanded the common-law by the application of
the dangerous instrumentality doctrine to automobiles. '
The Supreme Court of Florida first applied the doctrine to an auto-
mobile in 1917,1 and the principle has since received legislative recognition.5
The doctrine was originally limited to master-servant and principal-agent
1. Downs v. Norrell, 261 Ala, 430, 74 Sn.2d 593 (1954); Field v. Evans, 262
Mass. 315, 159 N.E. 751 (1928); Maiswinkle v. Peln Jersey Auto Supply Co., 121
N.J.L. 349. 2 A,2d 593 (Sup. Ct. 1938); Cencebaugh v. Ridley, 101 Ohio App. 233,
139 N.E.2d 57 (1953); Kantola v. Lovell Auto Co., 157 Ore. 534, 72 P.2d 61 (1937); 5a
AM. JUR. Automobiles §576 (1956); 60 C.J.S. Motor Vehicles 1428 (1949); Annot.,
100 A.L.R. 920 (1936).
2. E.g., CAL. VIIIcI.: Cooc ANN. § 402 (Supp. 1957); D.C. CODE ANN. § 40-424Supp. V1, 1951); IAO Corn, ANN. § 49-1404 (1957); IOWA CODE ANN. C. 321.
321.493 (Supp. 1958); Mric. CoME. LAws § 257.401 (Supp. 1956); NINN. STAT.
ANN. § 170.54 (West 1945); N.Y. VEHICLE AND TRAFFIC LAW § 59; R.I. GEN. LAws§ 31-31-3 (1956).
3. Weber v. Porco, 100 So.2d 146 (Fin. 1958); l.ylh v, \Vrlker. 159 Fin. 188.
31 So.2d 268 (1947); 3 171.A. JuR. Automobiles §§ 90, 152 (195); 2 Fi ORIA LAW AND
PRACTICE Automobiles §§ 10. 36 (1955); 5 B.AslrIELD, CYCLOPE.DIA OF Au'rOmOBILE
LAW AND PRACTICE § 2911 (Perm. ed, 1953); Comment, 5 U. FLA. L. REv. 412 (1952).
4. Anderson v. Southern Cotton Oil Co., 73 Fla. 432, 74 So. 975 (1917).
5. FLA. STAT. § 51.12 (1957),
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